CHRISTIAN LEUZ, University of Chicago

This study examines the role of political connections in firms’ financing strategies and their long-run performance. We view political connections as an example for domestic arrangements which can reduce the benefits of global financing. Using data from Indonesia, we find that firms with strong political connections are less likely to have publicly traded foreign securities. As a result, estimates of the performance consequences of foreign financing are severely biased if value-creating domestic arrangements such as political relationships are ignored. Connections not only alter firms’ financing strategies, they also influence long-run performance. Tracking returns across several regimes, we show that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when their patron falls from power, leading closely connected firms to underperform under the new regime and subsequently to increase their foreign financing.

CHRISTIAN LEUZ, University of Chicago - Graduate School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE Harvard Business School, Strategy Unit
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 81, pp. 411-439, August 2006

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